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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

GENEVA LUMBER

COMPANY~

Appellant,

vs .
PAYNE AND
a corporation,

DAY~

CASE
NO. 9075

INCL,

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff ·brought suit against defendant on an open acCOWlt, or in the alternative on a HQu_anturn MenlltH ~ seeking recovery of $7,294.61 claimed to be unpaid for materials
delivered. At the conclusion of a six day trial~ the Honor..
able Joseph E . Nelson~ Judge of the Fourth District Court
of Utah Cotu1ty~ granted defendanfs motion to dismissf and

this appeal was taken from the order of dismissal.. The
r;miies shall be hereinafter referred to as appellant and
respondent.
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Because appellant, in his brief, made but a partial state.
ment of facts, it will be necessary for us to here make a
supplementacy statement to complete from the record the
evidentiary facts upon which appellant has remained silent.
We agree that on this appeal that the rule of law applicable
is:r as stated by Justice Worthen in Williams vsJ ZCMij 6
Utah 2d 283 at Page 285: ~iwe must view- the testimony in
the light most favorable to plaintiff in determining the cor·
~ess of the judgment of dismissal at the end of p1aintiff~s case'). However we believe the rule is applicable· to
all appellant's evidence~ and not just selected parts of same.
L~t us proceed to a complete statem.ent of the facts involved.
t

The appellant! Payne and DayJ a l:tah Corporatioot during the year 1957 contracted for the construction of sixtyone homes in the Orem-~Provo area for sale to interested
buyers.. The homes we·re built successively in five different groups beginning with a gr9up of ten homes in Rose
Garden Subdivision at Orem, and when that was completed,
the remaining four groups of homes were constructed in
Mount Aire Subdivision, Provo. Respondent employed C.
E. Slavens as construction superintendent under separate
contracts covering eaeh group of homes in which his duties~
authority and compensation were specifically defined~ (Exhi"bits 20J 21, 22).. The construction superintendent procured bids from su·bcontractors on the labor and materials
necessary for the construction of each home in each group,
presented same to the respondent and same v..~ere accepted
by it Respondent then attached the bid to a \\o~titten agreement of which it was made a part, one for concrete flat work
labor and material~ (Exhibit 24), one for framing labor
through F.H~A. second inspection, (Exhibit 25)~ one for.
roofing labor and materials, (Exhibits 26 and 27), and one
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for two packages of building materials in connection with
each group of homes, (Exhibits 6 through 11). In all of
these contracts on each group of homes~ the parties fixed
a single unit home price and respondent inserted in each
the following provision:
hit is mutually agreed that any additions or deletions
in the materials to be furnished are to be given in writ ..
ing by party of second part (the corporation) to the
first party, and the value of the change, based upon
prices quoted in the attached list, shall either be added.
or subtracted from the original contract.•~

We have quoted the provision from the contract ~
tween respondent and appe11ant, Geneva Lumber Company
because we are concerned on this appeal only with those

contracts.
Respondent entered into five separate contracts on the
five groups of homes in questiont the first is dated Febru~
ary 2lt 1957, and it covered ten homes in Rose Garden Subdivision, Orem, {Exhibit 6)) the next is dated March 16~
1957~

and it covered eleven homes in Mount Aire Subdivi ..
sion, Provo, (Exhibit 10), the next was made June 3, 1957,
and it covered sixteen homes in Mount Aire Subdivision,
Provo~ (Exhibit 8), the next is dated July 26, 1957, and it
covered eleven homes in Mount Aire SUbdivisionJ Provo,
(Exhbit 7), and one dated SeptemJber 3+ 1957t covering
twelve homes in the Mount Aire Subdivision, Provo, (Exhibit 9). There was also a contract beh.veen the same par. .
ties dated September 23, 1957 ~ covering one hmne in the
Western Mail or Subdivision~ Orem~ (Exhibit 11) . These
contracts all incorporated appellant's bids for fu.mishjng
all materials necessary for the construction Gf each home
unit through first and second F.H.A inspections. With the
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exception of the designation of the group of homes cavered~
these contracts contained substantially identical provisions
and for that reason we \ViU refer to appellant's Exhibit 6 to
llustrate the contract provisions.
Exhibit 6 covers the Rose Garden group of homes at
Orem. It provides that appellant shall fill'nish materials for
plan No. 485, Schemes 1, 2J and 3, as per '-tattached lists~',
which become a part of the agreement '' for the price of
$2,116JMY'. It required the specified grade and quality indicated by the list and deivery within 15 days after being
ordered ·by the respondent. The attached lists are entitled
~~Building Material List for Three Bedroom House-Garage
plan \Vith gaJbled front porch plan 485, Package No. J ..
Schemes 1 ~ 2, 3.• , This list then specifies in detail the number of unts and the kinds and quality of materials necessary
to complete the package and prices out each unit and shor\.vs
a package number 1 total net price of $1610.00~ Then follows a list similarly titled for '~package No~ 2~ schedules 1,
2, and 3~" likewise detailing the materials and showi.ng the
net price for pa:ckage No-~ 2 of $506.00~ The contract then
provides for the above quoted writing in case there are any
additions or deletions in the list It is further provided that
materials shall be stacked on the jobsite in good order and
in accordance with the superintendent's instructions; that
the ·contract pri.'Ce shall hold for ninety days at which time
adjustments shall be made in accordance with current mar~
ket prices; that respondent will purch.Me the material at
the named price as needed; that payment for n1a-teriaJs delivered is to be made on the lOth of the month following
delivery to the 27th of the preceding month; Hthat delivery.
will be made and billed by package number as per attached
listu; and the agreement rovers the ten houses in Rose Gar~
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den Subdivision. The houses d£~"SCribed in this contract were
built and the parties fully performed their agreement.
On March 28~ 1957~ appellant, Geneva Lumber Company, billed respondent for. materials furnished as called
for in package No. 1 under the contract, Exhtbit 6~ which
comprised the framing materials taking each house up to
first F.H4A. inspection. A receipt dated April 10~ 1957, for
$16,100.00 was thereupon given by appellant to respondent
in payment for the materials in package 1~ (Exhi bit 12).
Alsot on April 10~ 1957, appellant executed and delivered
to respondent a receipt on each home unit described in ExWhit 6 for the sum of $1610.00 reciting that it was '•In full
payment for materials furnished'' as required ·by package
1 of Exh~bit 6. Likewise on April 27, 1957, appellant billed
respondent for materials furnished in package No. 2 on
each house Wlit described in Exhibit 6 and on May 10. 1957,
gave a separate receipt and lien waiver acknowledging payment in full for each unit package No. 2 materials as required by the contractt Exhibit 6t (Exhibit 12; Tr. 9()..93}.
Identical contracts were made between these same parties
on each of the other groups of homes (Exhibits 7 8, 9, 10~
and 11) pursuant to which appellant furnished the mate.
rials called for by package 1 and package 2 for each unit
and gave receipts in full on each home unit for all materials
furnished for same~ as well as lien waivers thereon. (Ex:hibits 13 A and B, 14 A, B:r and Ct 15 A, B~ and C~ 16 A, B,
C and D).
1

t

Three months after the date of the last contract (appellant's Exhibit 11) and after all of the contracts had been
fully perfonnedt including those of the general superintendent, C. E4 Slavens~ respondent corporation received a communication from Slavens (Exhibit 31) dated January 27,
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1958, enclosing a statement from a-ppellant for '~extras on
the 73 homes~' in the amount of $8398. 30,. and which in..
eluded documents in the nahlre of itemized statemen~ in
which Slavens stated hi need not say that the entire hill is
utterly ridiculous't. Although the appellant did not send
this statement directly to the respondent~ but rather,. sent
sa·me to Slavens, who no longer was employed by respondent and was then in Blanding, Utah, and this was the first
notice respondent had ·been given that appellant was making claim for extras Wide-r the contracts in question~ (Tr.
101-102). Appellant,. John Davis~ admitted on cross examination, that ·he was well aware of the contract prov:ision (Tr. 339..340) requiring a '•writing if there were any
additions or deletions~', and that he tried to get respondent
on the telephone for the ptwpose of procuring the writing
but was tmable to do so, (Tr4 337-339) 4 He also admitted
that no writing was procured from the respondent authorizing any of the additions of materials which he claims to
have fw~ished. Slavens denied that he ever told appeilant
that the required writing would not be necessary, (Tr. 418)~
Slavens did admit receiving, on or about July 1~ 1957t a
statement from appellantt (Exhibit 19) for $623.36 for extras on ucherry Lane Project~ (Tr. 419) and that he talked
to appellant, John Davis:r wife and she told him it was sent
oilt by mistaket (Tr. 440). The original complaint was filed
on ·May 28t 1958, and the amount of appellantts claim stated
therein is S8 t398 . 30, but after the taking of the depositions
of Slavens and respondent in July of 1958~ he filed the
amended complaint reducing the amount of the clajm to
$7!294.61, (Tr. 370-371).. We point this out to show the
nebulous character of appellant's claim, which was apparently confusing to appellant himse1ft (Tr. 419-420) .
t

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
AppeJlant offerecl, as evidence of his claimed extras
allegedly furnished respondent in the construction of the
five groups of homes:P three paper-back bookst (Exhibits
1~ 2 and 3} containing numerous undated entries of maf.e..
rials claimed to have been fttrnish-ed as '~additions'~ to the
lists attached to the con trtcts, (Exhibits 6, 7 ~ 8, 9~ 10 and
11). The tabs attached to Exhibits 1, 2t and 3, the red penciling and the crosses appearing therein were added by the
witnesses who identified same. Respondent made timely objections to Exhibits 1~ 2 and 3, and all oral evidence going
to the identification and explanation of same, and also to
appellant's Exhi bits 4 and 5, summarizing the reasoning
process employed by the witnesses, making conclusions
from the entries in the three books as to prices and materials. Respondent,s objection to this evidenee was made
on the ground that its admission would be a violation of the
parol evidence rule in view of the ~~additions and deletions~•
provision contained in the contracts in question, and on the
further ground that the evidence was self-serving and immaterialt (Tr. 288). The court admitted this evidence ''for
'vhat it is worth"~ (Tr. 40).
1

Appellant usd the date of the making of the contracts
6 through 11 respectively, to fix the time when the alleged
extras were furnished and thus ties Exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
directly into the contracts mentioned~ (Tr. 38). Thus, the
appellant dates the alleged delivery of materials by reasoning that this nebulous mass must have been furnished at the
veey time appellant was furnishing materials under the
above mentioned contracts, and in violation of the ~'addi
tions~' -provision of same+
1

Appellant clahned that respondentJs construction super·
intendent~ C. E.. Slavens~ authorized the appellant to fur-
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nish the claimed extras appearing in Exhibits 1, 2, and 3~
(Tr. 8-9-20), but there is no evidence in the record that
Slavens had any such authority, either express or implled.
Nmnerous attempts were made by appellant to prO\fe Slavens' authority by some statement he was alleged to have
made. The court, hrn.vever, sustained our objection to this
kind of evidence on the ground that agency cannot be proved
by oral s~tements af the alleged agent (Tr. 143-144; 162163) The authority of Slavens to hind respondent is shoom
by the contra.ct:s under which he was employed. In fa{_t,
respondent required a contract \\ !th each of the persons
who had any part in the construction of the homes in ques..
tiont ·whether it be for the flat concrete work, the roofingr
the construction labor, or the furnishing of materials. In
each such case~ rspondent protected itself as far as ~~addi·
tions and deletions' were concerned by the above quoted
contractual provision appearing in each contract.
1

L

7

1

We believe that under the foregoing facts~ vie-wed in
a light most favorable to appellant~ the provisions of the
.contracts covering the construction O!f" the 61 homes in ques-tion~ and particularly that provision in each pertaining to
the requirement of a writing from respondent in the event
that Hadditions and dele-tionsn were 1nade, and the law applicable to the .situation here, the court properly and correctly
granted respondent's motion to dismiss at the close of appellan tJ s ca..c;e.

The contracts for the construction of the homes in
question {Exhibits 6 through 11) provided for the furnishing of materials referred to in ea<~h contract as package 1
and package 2~ The court properly received evidence as
to· the- meaning of these package provisions. Slavens was
experienced in this ''package method'' of construction a.i ld
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was qualified to explain the '~packaget' bids which appellant
\Vas called upcm to make to the respondent. The package
1 lists attached to each contract called for the framing rna..
teria.ls necessary to construct the individual home tmits to
the point of the first F.H.A. inspectiont and package 2 lists
called for materials sufficient to take same to second F.
H.A. inspection. Slavens explained that in each package
there was a 10~'C mal"k-up leway~ that is to say~ 10% more
materials were specified in the lists than "vere actually
needed in the construction~ (Tr. 392-390).. Slavens further
testified that the 1ists could not be absolutely accurate in
specifying the exact amount of materials that would be required to carry the construction to the first and second inspection of F . H . A.t and hence the said lQ~,h leeway provided
against possible shortages. Under the package method employed in these contracts the appellant delivered the necessary materials to the jobsite and there wa:s always mate-.
rials left over upon completion of each of the five projects,
(Tr. 93-100: 405-407).. Respondent never claimed credit
for the overages, although they were substantial in each
case, because appellant owned the overages which resulted
in this way.. Upon completion of each job Wlder each con ...
tractt the appel1ant caused the materials left OV"er to be
inventoried and subtracted from the next succeeding project. This was true upon completion of Rose Garden, and
the four succeeding groups of homes at Mount Aire and in
each instance the appellant took credit for substantial
amotmts of materials which were not used in the preceding
project.
Our position with respect to appellant"s argument in
his brief, and for the affirmance of the judgment, follows.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY CONDUCf ON

THE PART OF RESPONDENT UPC)N \VHICH O)Ul..D
BE BASED ~~wAIVERt~ OR '~ESTOPPEL"'t OF TH1E CONTRAcruAL REQUlREMENT THAT r~M)DITIONS AKD
DELETIONS'' IN Iv!ATERIALS TO BE FURNISHED
WERE TO BE AUTHORIZED IN WRITING BY RESPONDENT, AND THE PROFERRED EVIDENCE ON
THIS POINT VIOLATES THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE.

POINT II
RESPONDENT'S CONSTRUCTION SUPERINTEN·DENT, C4 E4 SLAVENS, HAD NEITHER ACTUAL NOR
A·PPARENT AUTHORITY TO ALTER ANY PROVISION
OF RESPONDENT'S CONTRACTS VVITH APPELLANT~
AND PARTICULARLY THE PROVISION WITH RESPECT TO ~'ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS"').

POINT III
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE WAS NOT VIQ..
LA TED BY RESPONDENT SHOVVIN.-G THE MEANING
OF. THE PACKAGE 1\1ETHOD OF FURNISlllNG MATERIALS AS PROVIDED IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS.
POD'lT IV

. THE BILLINGS, THE PAYMENTS, TiiE RECEIPrSIN FULL AND LIEN WAIVERS WERE ALL MADE BY
THE upACKAGE') AS REQUIRED BY THE CONTRA.CfS.,
AND THERE WAS NO NEED FOR APPELLANT TO

EXPLAIN ANY OF THESE

DOCUMENTS~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY CONDUC'r ON
THE PART OF RESPONDENT UPON \VHICH COULD
BE BASED 4'WAIVER" OR ~~ESTOPPELn OF THE CONTRACI'UA·L REQUIREMENT THAT ~-&ADDITIONS AND
DELETIONS'' IN I\.iA.TERl.Al.S TO BE FURNISHED
WERE TO BE AUTHORIZED IN \VRITING BY RESPONDENT~ AND THE PROFERRED EVIDENCE ON
THIS POINT VIOLATES THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE.
Appellant's argument under Point I of his brief p~
ceeds upon the assumption that respondent's construction
superintendentt Slavens, had authority to waive the contractual provision requiring a "'tVriting from respondent in
the event of Hadditions and deletions~' of materials under.
the contracts. We believe that no such assumption is war·
ranted under the e\1dence in this case.. We do not quarrel
with the point of law cited under Point I in appellant's brief.
We assert~ however, that there is no fact appearing in this
record to which the rule can be applied~ Appellant relies
on the oral statement which he claims Slavens made at
Geneva's office in July of 1957, denied by Slavens~ about
keeping a separate record of the claimed extras and keeping it secret from respondent. It is argued. that this amoun. .
ted to appellant and respondent entering into an oral agreement to waive the writing require-ment provision for extras
contained in the said contractsr Alsot appellant apparently
seeks to have the principle of estoppel apply because when
he says he attempted to get in touch with respondent, he
was unable to do so. At least~ appellant admits that he
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knew well what the provision concerning additions and deletions was~ and that it was necessary to get in touch \vith
the respondent corporate officers and procure a writing
in the event extras were necessary. However, an agrot~s
authority oannot be shown by a reliance on oral declaration the agent is supposed to hi:ive made. The applicable
rule as stated in A.L.I. Restatement: Agency, Section 285
is as follov;s:
of a statement by an agent concerning the
existence or extent of his authority is not admissible

~ . Eviden-ce

against the principal to prove its existence or extent,
unless it appears by other evidence that the making
of such statement was VIi thin the authority of the agent
orJ as to persons dealing with the agent, within the
apparent authority or other power of the agent."~
See also 2 American Jurisprudence.. Section 445; and

3 AL.R. 2d 602 where it is said:
''In cases too numerous to be exhaustively collected the
proposition has been annormced that as against the
principal, ev-idence of extrajudicial statements of an
alleged agent is not admissible to show the fact of
agncy or the extent or scope thereof.~~

It is upon such oral declarations that appellant relies
and Wider the 1aw such reliance cannot be had. It is appellant. rather~ who should be estopped to assert such a flimsy
claim as he is malting upon the ground that he at all ti-mes
relied upon the contractst billed respondent at the couclusion of each and was paid according to the billing and rncei·pted respondent for full payment of all of the materials
furnished under all of the said contracts~ AppeUant seems
to have conspired with Slavens to keep secret what was going on conceming the claimed extras all during the period
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from Febtuary 1957 until November of 1957t when all of
these contracts were being performedJ and then some
three months later made claim that he had furnished extras despite the ,. additions and deletions~' provisions of said

contracts.
All through the trial it was respondenes position that
appelant's attempt to adduce oral evidence concerning his
claimed extras, was a violation of the parol evidence rule
because it was an attempt to vary the terms of the written
contract. Apparently the trial court, at the close of the
trial, reached the conclusion that this was what appellant
was attempting to do. The rule on which we relied is stated
in 3 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Section 1484 as follows:
'

All conversations and parol agreements between the
parties prior to a written agreement are so merged
therein that they cannot be given in evidence for the
purpose of changing the contract or showing an intention or understanding different from that expressed
in the written agreement.'

1

1

In the "'Model Code of Evidence~' of the 'American
Law Instituteu Dean Mason Lad~ commenting on the code at
page 35 5, states that~
1

its brief space1 it covers all of the Ia w of evidence
except parol evidence rule, which is regarded as a rule
of substitutive law rather than as a rule of evidence."'"

'~In

The practical importance of the application of the rule
in written contract like the one in the case at bar is stated
in Jenkins Used cars vs. Rice (1958) 7 Utah 2d, 276, 277~
323 P. 2d 259~ by this Court as follo\vs:
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uBut it is also clementary and of extreme practical importance that we hold contracting parties to their clear
and nnderstandable language deliberately committed to
writing and endorsed by them as signatories thereto~
Were this not so business, one with another among our
citizens~ would be relegated to the chaotic~ and the
basic purose of the law to supply enforceable rules of
conduct for the maintenaru."e' and im-provement of an
orderly society~s welfare and progress would find itself
impotent. It is not unrasonable to hold one responsible for language which he himself espouses. Such
language is the only implement he gives us to fashlon
a detenrunation as to the intentions of the parties. U nder such circwnstances we should not be required to
embosom any request that w-e ignore that very language. This is as it should be. The rule excluding matters outside the fotll' comers of a clearl' understandable docwnent:~ is a fair one, and one's contentions concerning his intent should extend no further than his

own clear expressions. t"
The respondent corporation was in a large building
enterprise and the corporate officers did not have direct
supervision of the work. For that reason it employed a
construction superintendent and gave him supervisory au-

thority only.

Respondent also nmde separete contracts

with all the other subcontractors who participated in any
way in the construction, among which appellant had
the written contracts for furnishing materials under the
package method of contracting+ Respondent had a right
to protect itself f1~om claims fur extras and did so by inserting jn each contract the provjs.ion with respect to uadditions and deletions"~- We do not th-ink appellant can arrange
with anyone to circumvent such written provision requir~
ing written authority for the furnishing of any extras, rely
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upon the contracts, receive payment and receipt in full for
materials furnished under same and then after complete
performance for the first time make these surprise claims
that extras had been furnish-ed... We believe the evidence
shows the claim is wholly \Vithout merit~ and that the court
rightly granted our motion to dismiss at close of appellanfs
case.
POINT II
RFSPONDENT~S

COXSTRUCTION SUPERINTENDENT,. C . E~ SLA.VENS.~ HAD NEITHER ACTl.JAL NOR
APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ALTER AN"Y PROVISION
OF RESPONDENT~S CONTRACfS WITH APPELLANT,
AND PARTICULARLY THE PROVISION WITH RESPECT TO hADDITIONS OR DELETIONSH+
In his Point II, appelJant clai·ms that Slavens had actual
or apparent authority to change the provisions of the contract in question~ He cites the record (Tr. 299) showing
alleged statements by Slavens that he had authority to do
so.. Appellant then oomplains that the trial court conunitted
error in ordering such alleged oral statements stricken from
the record on the grounds that the extent of an agenes authority cannot be shown by his voluntary declarations. He
claims these statements were admissible as part of the
res gtsfae and cites authorities on pages 14 and 15 of his
brief to sustain this position. An examination of these au~
thorities sho\v conclusively that they do not apply and do
not sustain appellant's position in that regard. For ex·
ample~ he cites A.L+I~ Restatement: Agency Section 284~
which is as fo1Iows:
''In actions between the principal and third persons, evidence of a statement by an agent is admissi-ble for or
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against either party for the pwpose of proving that

such statement \\raE made, if the fact that the statement was made constitutes~ or is relevant in the proof
of~ one of the ultimate facts required to . be established
In order to maintain a cause of action or defense. ''
It is apparent that this rule of law applies where it is
a matter between ''principal and third per.sonsn and not as
in the instant case~ ~between the parties to the written contract itself.. The case of Park vs. Moorman Mfg. Co. J 121
Utah 311, 241 Pac . 2d 914, (citd App. Br. 14) involved the
authority of an agent to make a warranty binding upon his
principal in dealing with a thlrd party.. It was held that
the agent from whom the authority came was the general
sales agent of the company and had authority to make the
representation to a third party from Whom he was soliciting
business. Also the Union Century Life Assurance vs. Glascock, 110 SW 2d 681, 270 KY. 750~ 114 A.L.R. 373, also
involved statements made by the agent to a third party
and not to one of the parties to a written agreement, as in
the case at bar. We believe that an examination of these
cases shows that appellant has misconceived the applicable
law here, for all of the authorities cited apply to the third
party situation.

The record shows that res{Xlndent hired Slavens Wlder
a written contract to supervise the construction of the build·
ing prcje-2L In all of the contracts made by respondent for
the l~bor and materials that went into the construction, it
provided that a writing was required in the event there were
~~additions or deletions'~ needed.
Although appellant well
kne\v of this provision, he proceeded in the teeth of it to
secretly make some claimed deal about extras with Slavens
in \\ hi ch SJ avens is alleged to have lnade the alleged state1
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ments about his authority. The f arthffit ~ ppe-1 lant geems
to have gone to procure the required writing, according to
his 0\VIl testimony was to make an attempt to get in touch
\vith res}X)ndent and which he never really accomplished.
1

Exhibit 19, dated July lt 1957j \vas never sent to re--spondent and no such claim \Vas ever disclosed to respondent dtrring con~truction. All of the contracts in question
made it clear to Slavens and the appeila.Jlt as well as of all
the su bcontractorst that if any extra 1nn.terials or labor
\Vere neededt authority to put them into the project had
to be procured from respoodent in writing~ This is not a
case where respondent~s construction superintendent was
making representation about his autl1ority to some third
party to procure materials. The most that can be made
out of appeHant's claim is~ if the same were taken to be
true, that he secretly furnished Slavens materials which hecalls extras without ever contacting respondent at any
time during the existence of the contracts in questioiL However, appellant relied upon and tied his claimed extras into
each one of the contracts in question, a~cepting payments
and receipting same in fullt and several months after such
rom.plte performance, he asserts a claim for extras. Significantly~ he did not send the cla i n1 to the respondent, but
rather mailed it to Slavens, who had completed his contract and was working in Monticello~ Utah+ He \\·ants us
to be-lieve that respondent indulged in some conduct from
which it can be inferred that Slavens had actual or apparent authority to do what appellant claims he did. We submit that the statements made by Slavens in his letter of
January 27~ 1958~ attached to Exhibit 31t correctly reflects
the situation when he said "I need not say that the entire
bjU is utterly ridiculous,'. We submit that the trial court
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made no error in excluding the profeiTed oral declaration
of an agent whose authority was limited by all of the contracts in question and his order doing so should be sustaine(t

POINT III
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE WAS NOT VIQ.
LATED BY RESPONDENT SHOWING THIE MEANING
OF THE PACKAGE METHOD OF FURNISIDNG :MATERIALS AS PROVIDED IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS.
In this particular, appellant claims in his brief~ that
because Slavens was permitted to explain a term contained
in the contracts in question and show from his experience
the meaning of the j"paekage methocl.'~ of buildingt the parol
evidence rule was violated. It is our position that this is
not so because ex·planation of contract terms can be made
without any violation of the rule. As is stated in A.L.L
Restatement: Contracts, Section 230~
liThe standard of interpretation of an integration} ex-

cept where it produces an ambiguOlLS result~ or is excluded by a rule of law establishing a definite meaning~
is the meaning that would be attached to the integration by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with
all ope-rative usages and knowing aU the circumstances
prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the
integration, other than oral statements by the parties
of what they intended it to mean.')
See ibid Section 228 as to integration being writing.
See also 20 American Jurisprudence 994, Section 1142.

Each of the contracts in question called for rna terials
for each home unit by ''packages"~ AppellantJs claim for
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extras involved the interpretation or meaning of the term
"package''. Indeed, appellant first raised the question on
dir~t. ex a.mination of Slavens (Tr. 225-226) \vhe re counsel
had hi n1 testify that the specified materials in the 'oipackages~' called for materials in excess of the amonnt required
to complete the package. This examination by counsel is
as follO\vs:
(By Mrr Sorensen)
Q~

oi'Do you know how Art Riley would under-

stand how to get the hinges if they were not on the
package list?
A.

Yes

Q.

How would he knmv that?
A. Because he needed them.
Q. Needed them and therefore he knew it; is that
your testi~mony today?
A. They kn€'\.V the material on the package~
Q. H<)l\\=' did they know th~t?
A. Because of the package system of buying.
Q. What about the materials that were not on

the package?
A.

overages

That was taken care of by the fact there were

or

material.
Q~
Show me any overages of material in the contract, Mr. Slavens.
A. Right beret I can sho\v you.
Q. You show me.
A.

30 pounds of 16 box nails.

Q.

W·hich exhibit?
A~
Each and very one. I went through and
checked them. In other words-

(Discussion between Counsel}
Q~

(By Mr~ Sorensen)

Which item are you talk-

ing about?
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A.. 16 box nails

and~

Shall we use any one of them?
Q. For the record, I draw your attention to Exhibit 5.. Do you lmow of your own knowledge how
many 16-penny box nails were in fact required by Ex-

hibits 6 to 11 inclusive?
A. Yes
Q. How many?
A.. 70 pounds per house and there- is 100 pounds
per house on the list.
Q. Have you gone through the contracts and totaled wh·at the contracts called for?
~

y~

~

Q. What figure did you come up with as the total
for all projects. Exhibits 6 to 11 inclusive?
A. If the 61 housesQ. AllS'\Ver my question.
{Discussion between Counsel)
A. 6100 pounds.J'
Despite the foregoing direct exam-ination, counsel for
appellant objected repeatedly and strenuously to our fur-

ther interrogating Slavens on cross examination concerning the meaning of the . 'packaget' term used in these contracts, (Tr. 393-399}~ The court's ruling on these objec..
tions was sound~ both from the p)int of view that contract
terms may be explained \Vithout violating the parol evidence rule~ and also that the matter opened up on direct
examination by appellant, it was proper to permit further
exploration of the same subject on cross exam·inatioo.

Also, we submit that appellant well understood that
upon completion of each of the contracts in question, that
there were overages from the material lists making up the
packages in each contract. Appellant's son testified on
cross examination of these overages for whieh appellant
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took creditr (Tr. 93-100). So that the 10~. .(. leeway testified to by Slavens produced substantial overages for which
plaintiff took credit by deducting this quantity of overage
materials from the package lists reqttircd for the succeed·
ing contract group. These overages more than covered
appellant's claimed extras and indicate that he was more
than paid in full for all of the claimed extra materials.
In any event we submit that appellant's Point III is
not well taken and Slavens' testimony did not violate the
parol evidence rule.
POINT IV

THE BILLINGSjl THE PAYMENTS, THE RECEIPTS
IN FLJLL AND LIEN WAIVERS WERE ALL MADE BY
THE '~PACKAGE'~ AS REQUIRED BY THE CONTRACTSf
AND THERE WAS NO NEED FOR APPELLANT TO
EXPLAIN ANY OF THESE DOCUMENTS~

In his Brieft Point IV, appellant seeks to shlft the emphasis from the contracts in question to what he called " lien
waivers'J in order to duck the parol evidence rule. He argues that the contracts in question were all complied with
by appellant in the matter of the delivery of materials called
for by packages 1 and 2, the billings for materials contained
ll1 each package, and the execution and delivery of the socai1ed ~'nen waivers'~, each of whieh contained the provision
~'received of Payne & Day, Inc. (dollar amormt) in full payment for materials furnished by the undersigned for and in
corutection "With the construction and improvements at
(description}''.. He further argues that the contracts were
thus relied upon by appe.Jlant for all the units covered by
them~ Again we call attention to the fact that the claimed
extras were claimed to have been furnished in connection
1
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with the construction of each of the homes covered by each
of these contracts.. Furthermore. it should be remembered
that in each of the said contracts, there was the provision
requiring a writing from the respondent for all uadditions
and deletionB~' of materials to be ftunished. Apparently in
order to evade the effect of this provisionj they argue that
the so-called ~'lien waivers'' were explained by the witn.esst
Davis~ to be ~'for the materials listed on the written contracts only''. We believe such argument to be specious and
not justifi·able on facts in this record or under the law applicable thereto.

The documents to which apellant refers~ in fact~ were
primarily receipts signed by appellant for payment in full
for all materials furnished, and the ~~lien waivers~' contained
therein are an additional evidence of this fact There is
no need for explanation of the documents because th.ere is
no ambiguity in the .same.. It is not this receipt and ' 1ien
waiv~, which we contend the parol evidence rule appli.efi
to. It is rather the contracts (Exhibits 6 through 11) which
appellant seeks to vary by parol evidence in viomtion of that
rule. The ~'lien waivers'' are merely an evidence of the performance of the contract in question~ Appellantts entire
claim is based upon these contra~, even to the reliance on
the date of each to establish the time when he allegedly
delivered the claimed extras.. He acknowledges the contracts and all of their tenn.s and his performance of same,
but \vhen jt comes to the contractual provision requiring
a writing with respect to ~-'addi tioru; and deletions',, he repudiates the contracts and asks the Court to help him violate sa me. Thinking to better his positiont he shifts a way
from the contracts in question and rushes to the so-called
~~uen \vaiver.":;'", claiming that they need explanation~ al1
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though they are clea1· and unambiguoust jn order to avoid
the parol evidence rule which clearly prevents him from
varying the terms of the written contracts.

The contracts in question required the delivery of materials called for in package 1 and package 2 for each home
Wlit. 'The lists for each package on each unit contained a
10 ~~}· leeway or overage of required materiat Appellant
delivered these materials called for, made billings for each
package on each of the unit~, received and acknowledged
payment in full of each package on each of the W1its and
executed lien waivers covering same. During all of the
time that the contracts in question were being performed~
appellant was secretly arranging \vith Slavens~ according
to his testimony, which was denied by Slavens, building up
extras to be asserted against respondent at some future
time.. Not until several months after all of the contracts
had been completely performed and appellant had receipted
in full payment for all materials called for by him~ appellant
asserted the claim against Slavens, and respondent had no
knowledge of it until three months after the constn.tction
was completed. All through the trial~ respondent objected
to the only proferred evidence in support of appellant's
clahn relying upon the provision of the contracts in question which required appellant to procure a writing from respondent covering any extras furnished~ The court, in considering the evidence submitted by appellant in support of
his claim, was of the opinion that~ viewing same in the light
most favorable to appellant~ it did not esta·blish his claim
for extras and granted respondent).s motion to dismiss. '\Ve
believe in so doing the court followed the facts which developed at the trial, and the law as applied to those facts~
and conunitted no error~
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CONCLUSION

On this record, viewing the evidence most favorable to
appellant, the court did not connnit error because: (1)
the uadditions and deletions" provision was a term of written contracts and CIJppellant' s proferred oral evidence lJii.o..
lated the parol eviden-ce rule as an attempt to vary same;
(2) respondent's constru'Ction superintendent had no authority~ eAl)ress or implied, to waive the contractual provision concerning ~~additions or deletions:Pt) nor was there
any grounds upon whieh estoppel could be applied against
respondent relying on said provision; (3) explanation of
the contract term ~~package'' by respolll.dent's witness was
not a violation of the parol evidence rule; and (4) the parties having fully performed the written contracts in question and appellantj' having been paid in full for all materials
furnished theretmder, cannot thereafter legally base a claim
on oral evidence which varies the terms of the written agreements. We respectfully urge that the order granting respondent's motion to dismiss be sustained and affirmed .
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE S. BALLIF
GEORGE E. BALLIF
For BALLIF & BALLIF
Attorneys for Respondent
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